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Sampling from a Bayesian Menu
Alan M. Zaslavsky
I am pleased that Steve Fienberg’s article opens
a discussion aimed at broadening the scope of statis-
tical methods applied to policy problems. His mezes
platter of case studies whets the appetite for a deeper
study of these application areas. My further thoughts
largely center on just what it means to say that
the examples he gives (some quite delicious, espe-
cially the aged wine of electoral projections) are
“Bayesian.” Fienberg argues on a combination of in-
tellectual and historical grounds for a unitary view
of Bayesian statistics, thus bringing a broad range
of statistical practice and applications under the
Bayesian awning. Despite the advantages of such
a comprehensive view, it is also useful to distinguish
the components, both to clarify their relationships
and so consumers of methodology who are not pre-
pared to eat the entire prix fixe dinner can still order
off the menu what suits their tastes and nutritional
needs. While Fienberg’s presentation emphasizes the
inferential entre´e, the assessment of posterior prob-
abilities, it may help to detail the offerings on the
Bayesian menu:
Main courses:
• A subjectivist understanding of probability, allow-
ing for meaningful probability statements about
singular events.
• Comprehensive model specification, including
– Likelihoods.
– Prior distributions.
• Use of Bayes’s theorem to “turn the Bayesian
crank,” making inferences about parameters (and
possibly predictive statements about unobserved
or future populations).
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Optional dishes:
• Subjective priors incorporating substantive prior
beliefs.
• Model selection by Bayesian methods; model mix-
ing.
• Hierarchical modeling.
Some of these dishes are commonly ordered a la
carte. Obviously, modeling is a central component
of statistical practice for statisticians of a variety
of schools, although a non-Bayesian generally has
more leeway to introduce nonmodel-based proce-
dures (such as resampling methods) into the mix.
In particular, despite the theoretical and histori-
cal connections Fienberg notes of hierarchical mod-
eling to Bayesian concepts of exchangeability, one
need not be a Bayesian to use hierarchical mod-
els, applying maximum likelihood estimation at the
top level, so-called Maximum Likelihood Empirical
Bayes (MLEB), or with some other non-Bayesian
procedure. Estimation for level 2 parameters (“ran-
dom effects” for the frequentist) may proceed us-
ing Bayes’s law, or by appealing to completely non-
Bayesian arguments like BLUP (best linear unbiased
prediction), thus eating the Bayesian omelet while
getting only the faintest whiff of the Bayesian eggs.
Distaste for Bayesian statistical approaches in pol-
icy settings arises at various points in this menu.
For the census, which each of the 435 members of
the House of Representatives views through the lens
of its impact on his or her own district, any use of
modeling aroused immediate suspicion due to fears
of manipulation of possibly arbitrary model spec-
ifications. Similar concerns contribute to the gen-
eral dominance of “design-consistent” classical sur-
vey sampling methods in government statistics, even
when “model-assisted.” It is noteworthy that the
statistical objections to using hierarchical models
in estimation of census undercount centered on the
use of any regression model that pooled information
across states, not particularly on the use of a hierar-
chical model (fully Bayesian or MLEB). Finally, the
Supreme Court ruled in 1999 against any use of sam-
pling for census apportionment counts, even with
estimation based on the purest of “design-based”
principles of unbiased survey estimation, citing con-
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cerns of susceptibility to manipulation, or at least to
controversy. (Oddly enough, the deciding opinion by
Justice O’Connor hinged largely on interpretation of
a grammatical construction in two apparently con-
flicting sections of the Census Act, as well as the
interpretation of the constitutional phrase “actual
enumeration.”) It is noteworthy that nonstatistical
details of census data-collection methodology that
might have equal or greater effects on outcomes,
such as the nature of the public awareness efforts
or the number of in-person follow-up attempts to
mail nonrespondents, are rarely subject to the same
degree of scrutiny.
Nonetheless, I agree that the main philosophical
objection to entering the Bayesian restaurant at all
concerns the choice of prior. In this regard, the dis-
tinction between “objective” and “subjective” Baye-
sian approaches becomes significant. As I under-
stand the objective approach, it does not require the
analyst to be committed to a prior as a representa-
tion of substantive prior beliefs, but only as a generic
device that leads to Bayesian inferences with good
frequency properties, that is, one which generates
calibrated probability statements, in the spirit of
Rubin (1984). Even improper priors, which since
they are not probability distributions cannot be re-
garded as coherent statements of prior beliefs, are
acceptable if they lead to posterior distribution with
good frequency properties over the desired range in
the hyperparameter space. The analyst gains access
to a well-specified inferential approach with a well-
developed set of techniques for estimation of poste-
rior distributions, and thus “eats a Bayesian omelet
made with powdered Bayesian eggs”—perhaps not
as tasty a dish as an inference based on a more sub-
stantive prior, but nourishing nonetheless. I would
place both the census and GOM disability exam-
ples of Fienberg’s article in this category. In neither
of these cases do I see choice of a prior as a sig-
nificant obstacle. To give a fairly typical example,
O’Malley and Zaslavsky (2008) estimated a correla-
tion matrix in a multilevel model using several de-
fault priors, comparing results from those that are
flexible enough to have desirable properties of near-
invariance to scale. As in Fay and Herriott (1979),
the likelihood at the lowest level of the model is ap-
proximated by a non-Bayesian calculation without
a complete model for the complex survey data struc-
ture.
The subjective Bayesian begins with an informa-
tive prior representing substantive beliefs. Such be-
liefs might be based on expert consensus (elicited
directly from experts or drawn from a review of the
literature) or inferred from relevant prior data. In
the latter case, the evidence might take the form
of a likelihood for the previous data, with param-
eters linked to those presently of interest through
a hierarchical model, possibly with default “objec-
tive” priors for hyperparameters (or even estimated
by MLEB, although the fully Bayesian model more
readily accommodates uncertainty about these pa-
rameters). For example, we might regard a trial of
a new drug as a priori part of an exchangeable se-
quence (conditional on some covariates) of trials of
the same or comparable drugs. (I particularly en-
joyed Fienberg’s exposition of the successes and tri-
bulations of such Bayesian approaches at the Food
and Drug Administration.) The substance of the
(scientific and policy) debate over the prior then
concerns the choice of the ensemble of relevant pre-
vious trials and the specification of the way in which
the results are believed to relate to each other, essen-
tially recasting this part of the model as a Bayesian
meta-analysis. Metahypotheses about how such evi-
dence should be combined might be evaluated in the
long run by the same criteria of goodness of fit and
predictive validity as are used in any other model
selection problem. Notably, many Bayesians favor
such frequency criteria in model selection (Rubin,
1984), departing from a purely Bayesian paradigm;
the latter might suggest relying on model averaging
among a number of a priori reasonable models, but
this compounds the problem of choosing and justi-
fying a prior distribution.
Fienberg’s climate change case study illustrates
how a Bayesian perspective offers a principled frame-
work for combination of sources of uncertainty. A sim-
pler example of the same principle concerns microsi-
mulation modeling of food stamp benefits (Zaslavsky
and Thurston, 1995; Thurston and Zaslavsky, 1996).
In these models, records on individuals are processed
by algorithms representing the application of cur-
rent program rules and proposed modifications to
calculate the impact of possible changes. Uncertain-
ties take a variety of forms: sampling variation in
the underlying database, stochastic simulation er-
ror, and uncertainty among alternative assumptions
about future macroeconomic conditions and about
parameters of submodels used to correct measure-
ment error or to impute variables not observed in the
underlying surveys. Nonsubjectivist views of prob-
ability offer no coherent framework for combining
these various forms of uncertainty. From a Bayesian
DISCUSSION 3
perspective, however, each is a contributor to pos-
terior variation; variance components can be parti-
tioned and attributed to the various kinds of uncer-
tainty by applying ANOVA to results of a designed
experiment in which the factors are systematically
manipulated. The resulting estimates show which
uncertainties are most important for each estimand
of interest, and therefore suggest how effort might
be best directed to reduce uncertainty by conduct-
ing additional simulations, obtaining more data, or
seeking more consensus on particular economic or
modeling assumptions.
In conclusion, there is too much at stake in current
policy-making to require it to rely on a single sta-
tistical philosophy. While not everything Fienberg
describes is the exclusive property of Bayesians, it
may well be the case that only those methodolo-
gists whose training gives them a taste for Bayesian
perspectives (rather than an allergy to them) will
be prepared to apply these tools. I applaud Fien-
berg for demonstrating, under the general rubric of
Bayesian statistics, how modeling in general, hier-
archical modeling in particular, and Bayesian philo-
sophical approaches can enrich the toolkit for policy
analysis.
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